Pembantaian 1965 - Dokumen Rahasia Ungkap Amerika Serikat, Inggris & Australia terlibat Pembantaian PKI

"Inggris menyuplai senjata, Amerika Serikat mendanai USD 50 juta, Australia turut campur dalam membuat propaganda pada Peristiwa G30S 1965"

Sri Lestari Wahyuningrum

Peneliti International People's Tribunal (IPT) 1965 

Sri Lestari Wahyuningrum

Peristiwa tahun 1965 di Indonesia bukan hanya meninggalkan jejak Amerika Serikat dan badan intelijennya, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) saja, belakangan terungkap peran dari sejumlah pihak yang ternyata turut memiliki andil & kepentingan dalam peristiwa tersebut.

Sejumlah dokumen yang dibuka ke publik menunjukkan bahwa ada jejak terang Inggris dalam peristiwa yang berujung pada jatuhnya Seokarno dan dihancurkannya Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI).

Dilansir dari laman detikNews, Sri Lestari Wahyuningrum mengatakan "Oktober 1965 mereka (AS) memenuhi permintaan TNI AD untuk mentransfer uang USD 50 juta"

Hasil sidang panel International People's Tribunal (IPT)  memutuskan keterlibatan Amerika Serikat secara resmi maupun tidak langsung telah mendorong faksi TNI AD Soeharto melancarkan operasi penumpasan terhadap PKI atau ratusan ribu orang yang dituduh sebagai komunis serta bertahap menggulingkan Presiden Soekarno.

Sidang International People's Tribunal (IPT) 

Banyak versi mengenai terjadinya pemberontakan G 30 S/PKI, menurut pemerintah dalangnya adalah PKI. Namun, versi lain mencuat CIA muncul di belakang peristiwa itu. Amerika ikut berperan dalam kejadian tahun 1965.

Hal tersebut diperkuat setelah pemerintah Amerika membuka arsip negaranya setiap tahun. Ternyata ada arsip tertulis yang menyatakan keterlibatan Amerika Serikat melalui CIA.

Beberapa lembaga independen dan non profit, yakini Amerika National Security Archive (NSA) dan National Declassification Center (NDC) bersama National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) menguak 39 dokumen, yang merupakan catatan korespondensi Kedutaan Amerika Serikat di Jakarta dengan Kementerian Luar Negeri periode 1964-1968.

Dokumen yang dibuka oleh beberapa lembaga tersebut adalah 39 dokumen setebal 30.000 halaman yang merupakan catatan Kedutaan Besar Amerika untuk Indonesia sejak 1964 hingga 1968. Isinya antara lain seputar ketegangan antara militer dengan PKI, termasuk efek selanjutnya berupa pembantaian massal.

Fakta yang tersaji dalam dokumen diplomatik Amerika ini membantah narasi tunggal bahwa korban pembantaian tragedi 1965 adalah komunis atau mereka yang memang terkait pembunuhan para jenderal dan upaya pengambil alihan kekuasaan pada 30 September 1965.

Dokumen tersebut menguak bahwa terjadi sebuah pertemuan rahasia,  pada tahun 1964 di Filipina yang merumuskan skenario Amerika Serikat untuk Indonesia. Yaitu skenario supaya Indonesia tidak jatuh kepada Komunis PKI. Kalau hal itu terjadi, maka posisi Amerika yang saat itu bertempur melawan Vietnam akan semakin terjepit.

Indonesia dan sejumlah negara Asia Tenggara pada 1960-an dinilai penting secara ekonomi dan strategis secara politik, terutama bagi Amerika Serikat, Inggris dan Australia. Inggris yang pernah menjajah sejumlah negara di kawasan ini. Menurut Mark Curtis dalamUS and British Complicity in the 1965 Slaughters in Indonesia di Third World Resurgence edisi 137, 2002, Asia Tenggara penting karena "merupakan produsen utama beberapa komoditas penting" dan "menempati posisi kunci dalam komunikasi dunia" serta menguasai rute penting laut dan udara.

Amerika Serikat dan para sekutunya  tidak ingin Indonesia dikuasai Komunis, karena dampaknya Malaysia dan Singapura juga akan dikuasai komunis. padahal saat itu Amerika sedang berperang melawan komunis

Skenarionya adalah memprofokasi PKI yang ditumpas oleh TNI AD dan mengakibatkan Soekarno akhirnya lengser.

Soeharto Terlibat Pembantaian Massal 1965 ?

Paul Lashmar dan James Oliver dalam buku Britain's Secret Propaganda War 1948-1977 menyatakan indikasi awal Inggris ingin menyingkirkan Soekarno terlihat pada 1962 setelah Soekarno menyatakan penentangan secara terbuka terhadap pembentukan Federasi Malaysia yang didukung London. Perdana Menteri Inggris Maurice Harold Macmillan (1957-1963) dan Presiden John F. Kennedy (1961-1963) setuju untuk "mengkudeta Presiden Sukarno, tergantung pada situasi, kesempatan dan momentum yang tepat.

Dalam telegram rahasia itu juga disebutkan, "bahwa pada tanggal 12 Oktober 1965  Tentara Angkatan Darat Indonesia mempertimbangkan menjatuhkan Soekarno dan mendekati beberapa kedutaan negara-negara Barat memberi tahu soal kemungkinan itu. Jika semua skenario itu sukses, maka itu akan dilakukan dengan gerakan yang cepat tanpa peringatan dan Soekarno akan digantikan kombinasi junta militer dan sipil"

Presiden Soeharto dalam memoarnya pada 1971 pernah menjelaskan mengapa sampai jatuh korban pasca-G30S. Analisis penyebab banyaknya pembunuhan dijelaskan Soeharto dalam pidato tahun 1971:

"Ribuan korban djatuh di daerah-daerah karena rakjat bertindak sendiri-sendiri, djuga karena prasangka-prasangka buruk antargolongan yang selama bertahun-tahun ditanamkan oleh praktek-praktek politik jang sangat sempit."

Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia pada 23 Juli 2012 memutuskan bahwa berbagai kekerasan setelah peristiwa 30 September 1965 merupakan pelanggaran berat hak asasi manusia, berdasarkan hasil penyelidikan sejak 2008. Pengumpulan bukti dan pemeriksaan 349 saksi dilakukan di hampir seluruh wilayah Indonesia.
Jumlah korban menurut Komnas HAM di kisaran "500 ribu hingga 3 juta jiwa"

Sedangkan menurut riset dan investigasi Yayasan Penelitian Korban Pembunuhan 1965/1966 (YPKP 1965/1966) menyebut total korban pasca-peristiwa Gerakan 30 September 1965 mencapai jutaan. Tak banyak versi resmi pemerintah tentang jumlah korban tewas dalam operasi penumpasan anggota PKI.

New York Times pada Mei 1966 menuliskan jumlah korban tewas mencapai 300 ribu orang. New York Times beberapa bulan kemudian, seperti dipaparkan buku Dalih Pembunuhan Massa, kembali menyelidiki dan menyimpulkan jumlah korban mati seluruhnya lebih dari setengah juta orang.

Ramainya media Amerika Serikat memberitakan dugaan pembunuhan pasca-30 September itu sampai juga ke senator Robert F. Kennedy. Adik presiden John F. Kennedy itu pada pidato Januari 1966 mengkritik Presiden Amerika Serikat Lyndon Johnson yang diam saja terhadap kondisi Indonesia.

Putusan akhir pengadilan rakyat internasional atas kejahatan kemanusiaan periode 1965 di Indonesia atau International People’s Tribunal (IPT) 1965  menyebutkan peran Soeharto.

Putusan tersebut menjelaskan detail bagaimana peran sentral Jenderal Soeharto dalam peristiwa pembantaian massal 1965 dan sesudahnya. Putusan hakim menyebutkan sejak 2 Oktober 1965, Jenderal Soeharto langsung mengambil kontrol de facto atas ibu kota dan angkatan bersenjata.

Sebuah Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban (Kopkamtib) dibentuk pada 10 Oktober untuk menumpas PKI dan orang-orang yang diduga sebagai simpatisannya.

Pada 1 November, Jenderal Soeharto ditunjuk sebagai Kepala Komandan dari Kopkamtib. Dengan demikian, komando ini beroperasi di bawah perintah langsung darinya. Selanjutnya Soeharto dan kroni-kroninya segera menuding PKI sebagai dalang dari Gerakan 30 September (G30S0).

"Sebuah kampanye propaganda militer yang menyebarluaskan foto-foto para jenderal yang mati dan mengklaim bahwa Partai Komunis Indonesia lah, terutama perempuan-perempuan Gerakan Wanita Indonesia (Gerwani), yang menyiksa dan mencungkil mata atau memutilasi alat kelamin mereka sebelum meninggal,” 

bunyi laporan itu.

Akibat propaganda ini, kekerasan dan demonstrasi terhadap orang-orang yang diduga komunis dilakukan oleh tentara dan kelompok-kelompok pemuda yang dipersenjatai dan atau didukung militer dan pemerintah. Kekerasan ini terjadi di Aceh, Jawa Tengah, dan Jawa Timur, dan menyebar ke seluruh tanah air.

Pada 21 Desember 1965, Jenderal Soeharto mengeluarkan sebuah perintah (Kep-1/KOPKAM/12/1965) untuk para pimpinan militer di seluruh Indonesia untuk mengumpulkan daftar-daftar anggota PKI dan organisasi-organisasi yang berafiliasi dengan partai tersebut di daerahnya masing-masing.

Putusan hakim pengadilan juga menyebutkan beberapa komandon militer yang dapat diminta pertanggungjawaban yakni Komando Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban disingkat Kopkamtib periode 1965-1969, Kopkamtib 1969-akhir 1978, dan komandan wilayah setempat periode 1965-1969 dan periode 1969-1978.

Selain menyebutkan Soeharto sebagai nama perseorangan, dokumen putusan sidang tak menyebutkan nama lain dari pihak apapun.

“Bukti dokumentasi terkini mengenai pembantaian benar-benar kurang, dan tampaknya akibat ditekan oleh aparat-aparat militer,” 

bunyi laporan itu.

Supersemar
Peristiwa Gerakan 30 September 1965 menjadi titik awal bagi keruntuhan Soekarno dari panggung politik Indonesia. Turunnya Soekarno dari kursi kepresidenan melahirkan suatu pemerintahan baru yang memiliki semangat untuk menegakkan Pancasila dan melaksanakan UUD 1945 secara murni dan konsekuen. Tekad inilah yang disebut sebagai Orde Baru dan melahirkan kepemimpinan baru yaitu Soeharto.

Terlihat jelas ketika pasca penyerahan Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret (Supersemar/SP 11 Maret) 1966, benar-benar dimanfaatkan oleh Soeharto sebagai pengemban surat sakti, dengan mengambil kebijakan dan keputusan politik, seperti pembubaran Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) dan ormas-ormasnya.

Padahal dictum dari Supersemar sendiri lebih menekankan pada penyerahan kekuasaan militer (secara teknis, bukan politis) dan bukan sebagai penyerahan kekuasaan politik. Supersemar bukanlah transfer of authority (pengalihan kekuasaan) dari presiden Soekarno kepada Soeharto.

Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia (ANRI) saat ini menyimpan tiga Supersemar. Namun, ketiganya memiliki versi masing-masing.

Berdasarkan pemeriksaan laboratorium forensik (Labfor) Mabes Polri, semuanya dinyatakan belum ada yang orisinal, belum ada yang autentik. Jadi, dari segi historis, perlu dicari terus di mana Supersemar yang asli itu berada.

Mayor Jenderal Amirmachmud bersama Mayor Jenderal M. Jusuf dan Mayor Jenderal Basuki Rachmat menjadi tiga jenderal yang terlibat langsung dalam sejarah Surat Perintah 11 Maret 1966 (Supersemar).

Supersemar yang dibawa tiga jenderal ke Istana tersebut untuk ditandatangani Presiden Soekarno itu membuka jalan bagi Letnan Jenderal Soeharto menjadi orang nomor satu di Indonesia. Tiga jenderal itu ikut meninggi pula kariernya.

M. Jusuf menjadi Menteri Perindustrian hingga 1978, setelahnya jadi Panglima ABRI merangkap Menteri Pertahanan Keamanan. Sementara itu Basuki Rachmat dan Amirmachmud jadi Menteri Dalam Negeri.

Ajudan Presiden Soekarno, Letnan Dua
Soekardjo Wilardjito, mengungkap bahwa sang Presiden dalam kondisi tertekan saat meneken surat itu. Bahkan, dia menyebutkan bahwa jenderal Angkatan Darat bernama Maraden Panggabean menghadap Soekarno dan menodongkan pistol FN 46 sambil menyerahkan dokumen Supersemar. Penuturan ini disampaikan Soekardjo setelah kejatuhan Presiden Soeharto terjadi pada tahun 1998, 32 tahun setelah berkuasa.

Soekardjo menuturkan bahwa saat itu ada empat jenderal yang menghadap Presiden Soekarno. Mereka adalah para anak buah yang diutus Soeharto untuk mendapat surat mandat dari Soekarno. Surat yang mereka bawa tersebut disusun oleh Alamsyah dan diketik Ali Murtopo dari Badan Pusat Intelijen (BPI)

Letnan Dua Soekardjo Wilardjito

Hari itu, Mayjen Maraden Panggabean (Wakasad), Mayjen M Yusuf dan Mayjen Amirmachmud mendatangi Soekarno di Istana Bogor dengan membawa map merah muda. Mayor Jenderal M Yusuf kemudian menyodorkan sebuah surat yang harus ditandatangani. Ketika Bung Karno disodorkan surat tersebut, Soekarno memprotes.

"Lho, diktumnya kok diktum militer, bukan diktum kepresidenan!" 

ungkap Bung Karno

Kecurigaan Soekarno tersebut disebabkan kop yang disodorkan tidak ada lambang Garuda Pancasila yang berbunyi Presiden Indonesia, yang ada hanyalah kop Mabes Angkatan Darat.

Mendengar protes tersebut, sambil menyerahkan dokumen Supersemar kepada Soekarno, Mayjen Maraden Panggabean lalu mencabut pistolnya, lalu menodongkannya kearah Soekarno.

"Untuk mengubah, waktunya sangat sempit. Tandatangani sajalah paduka ! Bismillah,"

perintah Basuki Rachmat.

Melihat Soekarno dalam keadaan terintimidasi, Sukardjo yang merupakan ajudan Soekarno pun dengan cepat juga mencabut pistolnya. Namun, karena tak ingin ada pertumpahan darah, Soekarno mengalah dan mau menandatangani surat itu.

"Jangan! Jangan! Ya, sudah kalau mandat ini harus kutandatangani, tetapi nanti kalau masyarakat sudah aman dan tertib, supaya mandat ini dikembalikan kepadaku," 

ungkap Soekarno. 

Para jenderal itu lalu pamit setelah mendapat dokumen yang sudah diteken itu. Mereka kemudian menghadap kembali ke Soeharto untuk menunjukkan bahwa telah ada surat resmi peralihan kekuasaan. Berbekal surat itu, Soeharto merasa telah memegang kuasa eksekutif untuk mengembalikan kondisi Tanah Air ke situasi normal.

Dengan demikian, suksesi kekuasaan dari Sukarno ke Soeharto memang tidak terjadi seperti yang selama Orde Baru diyakinkan kepada masyarakat. Soeharto langsung menangkap sejumlah menteri yang terkait G30S, hingga memenjarakan & membantai siapa pun yang berkaitan dengan PKI, meskipun orang tersebut belum terbukti ada sangkut-pautnya dengan PKI.

Dokumen (Supersemar) tersebut tidak hilang, melainkan sengaja dihilangkan. Jika dokumen tersebut hilang secara tidak sengaja, maka masih ada kemungkinan untuk ditemukan. Tetapi, hingga saat ini dokumen tersebut tidak diketahui keberadaannya. Sehingga patut diduga ada kesengajaan untuk membuat dokumen itu sulit ditemukan.
Supersemar itu dokumen negara dan bukan surat pribadi. Mengala bisa hilang? Lagipula ada beberapa Jenderal yang menyaksikan penyerahan surat tersebut dari Soekarno ke Soeharto. Jadi, tidak mungkin hilang.

Tidak ada yang tahu di mana surat asli Supersemar berada. Selain itu, banyak versi yang beredar. Teks otentik itu penting untuk kita lihat asas orisinalitasnya. Kalau tidak ada, ya seperti sekarang, debat yang tidak ada habisnya.

Masalah Supersemar dalam sejarah sudah tidak bisa dipersoalkan lagi. Kita harus move on untuk berdamai dengan sejarah. Kita harus bisa menerima perjalanan sejarah bangsa sebagai fakta.

Hampir semua tokoh terkait telah tiada. Jika nantinya Supersemar yang asli ditemukan, siapa yang harus bertanggungjawab atas kekeliruan sejarah yang telah terlanjur terjadi? Pak Harto sudah meninggal, Bung Karno juga sudah meninggal.

Supersemar menjadi peringatan bagi para penguasa agar tidak membelokkan sejarah untuk kepentingannya. Karena mereka bisa saja menuliskan sejarah menurut kemauannya, namun tidak bisa menghapuskan kebenaran.

Referensi:

3 Negara Dituding Terlibat dalam Peristiwa 1965 
detikNews 

Dokumen rahasia AS: Korban 'tuntut' tanggung jawab Amerika 
BBC News Indonesia 

Dokumen rahasia Amerika: AS mengetahui skala pembantaian tragedi 1965 
BBC News Indonesia

CIA Diduga Dalangi Tragedi PKI 
Hidayatullah.com 

G30S 1965: Inggris Sudah Lama Ingin Singkirkan Soekarno TEMPO.co

Putusan Pengadilan Rakyat 1965: Indonesia Lakukan Genosida 
CNN Indonesia 

Supersemar, Surat Sakti Penuh Misteri - Kompas.com

Benarkah Soekarno Ditodong Pistol Saat Teken Supersemar? - Kompas.com 

Panggabean Cabut Pistol di Kala Basuki Rahmat Minta Bung Karno Tanda Tangan Super Semar Berkop AD 
Wartakota TRIBUNnews.com 

Jika Supersemar Palsu, Apakah Orde Baru Tidak Sah? - Tirto.id

Berapa Sebenarnya Korban Pembantaian Pasca-G30S 1965?
TEMPO.co 

Hukum Merayakan Hari Valentine bagi Umat Islam

Euforia hari kasih sayang ini memang seringkali terasa ketika bulan Februari datang. Di mal, supermarket dan kafe didominasi dengan hiasan bunga, pernak-pernik berwarna hati, diskon makan malam romantis, serta balon-balon yang menyemarakkan berbagai tempat.

Valentine's Day sendiri menjadi sebuah perayaan atau budaya yang banyak dilakukan oleh berbagai negara termasuk di Indonesia. Banyak hal yang digunakan untuk melambangkan Valentine mulai dari coklat, kartu, bunga ataupun ornamen berbentuk hati.

Sejarah Hari Valentine 

Perayaan  Hari Valentine zaman dulu, berbeda dengan perayaan zaman kini. Zaman dahulu, perayaan dimulai pada tanggal 15-nya Tidak sama dengan saat ini yang hanya merayakan ketika tanggal 14 saja. Ada berbagai versi menceritakan tentang hari Valentine yang dirayakan setiap tanggal 14 Februari ini.

St. Valentine Dan Claudius II
Menurut Ensiklopedi Katolik (Catholic Encyclopaedia 1908 ), istilah Valentine yang disadur dari nama “Valentinus”, merujuk pada tiga martir atau santo (orang suci dalam Katolik) yang berbeda: seorang pastur di Roma, uskup Interamna, dan seorang martir di Provinsi Romawi Africa.

Valentine dipukuli dan berakhir dipancung pada tanggal 14 Februari 278 Masehi. Bentuk eksekusi ini merupakan sebuah hukuman karena pendeta Valentine dianggap menentang kebijakan seorang Kaisar bernama Claudius II.

Claudius II dikenal kejam setelah membuat Roma terlibat dalam berbagai pertempuran berdarah. Hal ini agar Roma selalu menang dalam peperangan. Sehingga sang Kaisar harus menunjukkan memiliki tentara yang kuat. Namun hal tersebut ternyata sulit untuk diwujudkan, karena menurut sang Kaisar bala tentaranya enggan pergi ke medan perang karena terikat pada istri atau kekasih mereka.

Untuk mengatasinya Claudius II melarang semua bentuk pernikahan serta pertunangan yang ada pada Roma. Sayangnya pendeta Valentine ini menentang kebijakan tersebut, ia berusaha secara diam-diam menikahkan pasangan muda.

Tindakan ini ketahuan dan pada akhirnya pendeta Valentine ditahan serta dihukum, kemudian tubuhnya dipukul hingga dipancung. Hukuman ini menjadikan sebuah tanda sebagai peringatan atau perayaan yang dilakukan setiap tanggal 14 Februari.

Sejarah Valentine yang sebenarnya ini memang lebih banyak dipercaya, karena legenda yang beredar menyebutkan bahwa Valentine meninggalkan catatan perpisahan untuk putri penjaga penjara yang menjadi temannya. Dengan tulisan 'From Your Valentine' ini menjadi populer dan banyak menginspirasi. Atas jasanya, Valentine dinobatkan sebagai orang suci hingga disebut sebagai Santo Valentine.


Festival Lupercalia
Festival Lupercalia ini, sudah menjadi tradisi bangsa Romawi kuno yang tidak terlepas dengan hal-hal yang berbau seks. Sejarah ini ditulis oleh J.A North dalam The Journal of Romance to this volume 98 2008.

Lupercalia merupakan tradisi nenek moyang Romawi kuno yang tidak bermoral dan tidak melambangkan kehangatan atau kasih sayang sama sekali. Namun pada sebuah waktu tradisi ini diubah menjadi lebih baik. Festival Lipercalia yang sering kali dilakukan dianggap sebagai salah satu tradisi untuk menghormati Dewa kesuburan pada zaman pra Romawi. Bedanya, Lupercalia ini umumnya dirayakan pada tanggal 15 Februari, sedangkan Valentine dirayakan satu hari sebelumnya yakni pada tanggal 14 Februari.

Festival Lipercalia dilakukan dengan cara memasukkan nama berbagai wanita ke dalam sebuah kotak. Kemudian pria akan acak mengambil sebuah nama yang nantinya akan dijodohkan atau dipasangkan.

Tradisi Pagan Lupercalia

Namun seiring perkembangan zaman budaya ini mulai berubah dan tradisi ini diganti hanya dengan mengungkapkan kasih sayang ketika hari Valentine tiba.

Saat ini, perayaan valentine umumnya dirayakan dengan orang-orang tercinta, menghabiskan waktu bersama, memberi coklat untuk orang terkasih, saling bertukar hadiah,  ataupun mengirimkan kartu ucapan bernadakan ungkapan kasih sayang.

Hukum Merayakan Hari Valentine bagi Umat Islam

Trend Valentine Day di kalangan pemuda-pemudi muslim kebanyakan didasari sekadar ikut-ikutan. Mereka jarang sekali mengetahui sejarah tentang valentine day.

Pengungkapan bentuk kasih sayang yang dilakukan oleh para remaja sudah sangat melampaui batas, bahkan diluar hari Valentine.

Atas nama cinta, kasih sayang, valentine day, mereka mau saja dengan rela melakukan hubungan asusila yakni berhubungan badan dengan pasangannya tanpa diikat oleh pernikahan.

Beberapa negara yang mayoritas penduduknya beragama Islam pun telah menyikapi perayaan hari valentine, khususnya oleh lembaga fatwa resmi.

Semua ulama di seluruh dunia sepakat, umat Islam tidak boleh merayakan Valentine karena Valentina adalah “ritual” atau “hari raya” non-Muslim. Tidak ada dasarnya dalam syari’at, sunnah dan hadist.

Rasulullah Saw dengan tegas melarang umat Islam untuk mengikuti tata cara peribadatan selain Islam:

“Barangsiapa meniru suatu kaum, maka ia termasuk dari kaum tersebut” 

(HR. At-Tirmidzi).

HARAM hukumnya bagi umat Islam untuk ikut-ikutan merayakan Hari Valentine dengan tingkat partisipasi sekecil apa pun, bahkan sekadar mengucapkan “Selamat Hari Valentine” atau “Happy Valentne”

Ulama kenamaan, Ibnul Qayyim, berkata:

“Memberi selamat atas acara ritual orang kafir yang khusus bagi mereka, telah disepakati bahwa perbuatan tersebut haram. Semisal memberi selamat atas hari raya dan puasa mereka, dengan mengucapkan “Selamat hari raya!” dan semisalnya.

Di Indonesia sendiri, MUI pusat belum pernah mengeluarkan fatwa resmi soal perayaan hari valentine. Namun, beberapa MUI di daerah sudah mengeluarkan fatwa soal perayaan Hari Valentine. Salah satunya MUI Kota Bogor yang mengeluarkan fatwa soal valentine pada 2012. MUI Kota Bogor mengimbau agar umat Islam tidak ikut dalam perayaan Hari Valentine yang merupakan tradisi dan budaya agama lain.

MUI Kota Bogor juga melarang umat Islam untuk menyemarakkannya dengan mengirimkan SMS, kartu ucapan selamat, mencetak, menjualnya, dan mensponsori acara-acara tersebut karena termasuk tolong-menolong dalam berbuat dosa dan maksiat. Menurut MUI Kota Bogor,  kalangan remaja yang mengikuti perayaan hari valentine sering terjerumus dalam pergaulan bebas (khalwat dan ikhtilath) yang termasuk dalam larangan mendekati zina. Maka tindakan saddu dzari' (istilah ushul fikih) wajib dilakukan, yakni menutup segala peluang dan pintu-pintu maksiat serta yang mendekatkan pada perbuatan zina.

Umat Islam dilarang merayakan Hari Valentine dengan cara apa pun. Seorang muslim yang beriman kepada Allah dan Hari Akhir tidak boleh melakukannya, mengakuinya atau ikut mengucapkan selamat bahkan seharusnya meninggalkannya dan menjauhinya sebagai sikap taat terhadap Allah dan Rasul-Nya.

Hendaknya setiap muslim berpegangteguh dengan Al kitab dan As sunah dalam semua kondisi lebih-lebih pada saat-saat terjadinya fitnah dan banyaknya kerusakan. Hendaknya pula ia benar-benar waspada

Kita hormati keyakinan mereka, namun tidak boleh ikut merayakannya.

Kepedulian kita terhadap kondisi yang sedang berkembang di tengah-tengah remaja akan mendapatkan hasil yang maksimal jika semua pihak bergerak dan saling mendukung.

Semua pihak harus saling mendukung setiap ada kebijakan atau bentuk lainnya yang dijadikan sebagai upaya pencegahan perbuatan-perbuatan maksiat yang ada di sekitar kita.

Pemerintah harus terus mengeluarkan kebijakan-kebijakan yang sangat pro rakyat seperti ini dalam pencegahan kemaksiatan di tubuh masyarakat. Termasuk pada kebijakan-kebijakan lain seperti pelarangan penjualan minuman beralkhohol di minimarket atau swalyan.

Kita sebagai warga akan terus mendukung kebijakan-kebijakan yang serupa yang dibuat oleh pemerintah karena sangat meresahkan banyak pihak.


Referensi:

Fatwa Al-Lajnah Ad-Da imah lil Buhuts Al-Ilmiyah wal Ifta (21203) tanggal 22/11/1420 H

Buku "Fatwa-Fatwa Terkini jilid 2
Muroja’ah" 
oleh Ust. Subhan Khadafi

Sejarah dan Legenda di Balik Hari Valentine 
Detik News

Hukum Merayakan Hari Valentine
RisalahIslam.com

Hukum Merayakan Valentine’s Day
Muslimah.Or.Id 

Ada Maksiat di Balik Valentine’s Day 
Dakwatuna  

Fatwa Hari Valentine dari Arab Saudi Hingga Indonesia 
REPUBLIKA.co.id 

Makanan dan Minuman Yang Terbuat Dari Tinja & Urin Manusia

Faktanya, ada Steak, Sosis, Burger, bahkan minuman beralkohol yang diolah menggunakan bahan dari tinja dan urine nanusia.

Namun, bahan makanan dan minuman tersebut harus melalui sejumlah tahap proses pengolahan yang sedemikian rupa, agar tidak membahayakan orang yang mengkonsumsinya, bahkan ada yang berdampak positif terhadap kesehatan.

ilustrasi Steak dan Sosis (foto: www.hiddenboston.com)

Steak Tinja
Di Jepang, Mitsuyuki Ikeda, seorang peneliti dari Okayama Laboratory menciptakan inovasi makanan dari tinja manusia. Mitsuyuki Ikeda mengolahnya menjadi 'steak tinja, topping burger atau sandwich'

Mitsuyuki Ikeda menemukan adanya kandungan protein tinggi dalam lumpur limbah tinja. Pengolahannya dengan mengekstrak protein llimbah, lalu memberi cairan enhancer. Setelah setengah jadi, daging buatan dimasukkan ke alat exploder untuk diolah sebelum dapat benar-benar dimakan.

Mitsuyuki Ikeda 

Agar warnanya terlihat merah segar seperti daging pada umumnya, ia menambahkan cairan pewarna dan menambahkan protein kacang kedelai.

"Poop Steak" created by Mitsuyuki Ikeda, from human feces 

Masalah rasa, tak perlu disangsikan, sebab uji coba rasa awal menyatakan rasa steak daging buatan ini sama seperti steak daging sapi biasa.

Namun, inovasi tersebut menghadapi banyak kendala. Pertama, biaya pembuatan steak daging kotoran ini lumayan mahal. Bisa mencapai 10-20 kali lipat dari pembuatan steak daging sapi biasa. Masalah kedua, tentu saja rasa jijik yang menghinggapi para konsumen ketika tahu bahan baku daging steaknya terbuat dari tinja manusia.

Masalah kedua adalah komposisi gizi steak ini yang terlalu tinggi, yakni 63 persen protein, 25 persen karbohidrat, 9 persen mineral, dan 3 persen lipid. Hal tersebut dapat memicu obesitas dan komplikasi penyakit berbahaya seperti kolesterol, serangan jantung, diabetes, dan sebagainya.

Sosis Tinja
Di Spanyol, inovasi mengolah tinja menghasilkan sosis “Feut” yang berbahan dasar tinja bayi. Inovasi ini diklaim memiliki beragam manfaat, seperti melancarkan pencernaan.

Yang dimaksud sosis dari tinja bayi ini tidak seperti daging tinja manusia yang dibuat di Jepang. Sosis yang dipakai memang sosis asli yang terbuat dari daging sapi, hanya saja ditambahkan sejumlah bakteri yang diambil dari tinja bayi untuk membuat cita rasa  sosis menjadi lebih lezat.

Tim ilmuwan di Spanyol yang menguji bakteri dari 43 sampel kotoran bayi menemukan enam bakteri, namun hanya satu yang sepenuhnya menjadi sosis. Bakteri yang diambil adalah bakteri prebiotik, yakni Lactobacillus dan Bifidobacterium.

Selain menjadikan sosis lebih lezat, bakteri ini nantinya akan membuat sosis menjadi makanan kesehatan yang mengandung prebiotik, seperti yoghurt. Probiotik adalah suatu mikroorganisme hidup yang bermanfaat bagi kesehatan inang, baik itu hewan maupun manusia.

Bakteri probiotik memiliki banyak manfaat untuk kesehatan manusia, di antaranya untuk sistem kekebalan, sistem intestinal, sistem urogenital, hingga menurunkan efek alergi. Sedangkan Bifidobacterium dan lactobacillus digunakan pada orang-orang dengan sindrom iritasi usus, ulcerative colitis, atau kantong ileum. Juga bisa digunakan perempuan untuk mendukung kesehatan vagina.

Minuman Fermentasi Tinja
Ttongsul merupakan Wine minuman beralkohol di Korea Selatan, terbuat dari fermentasi tinja anak-anak dan alkohol dari sulingan air gandum selama berbulan-bulan.

Minuman dengan kadar alkohol 9 persen ini digunakan sebagai obat tradisional oleh orang Korea zaman dulu, untuk menyembuhkan luka, tulang yang patah hingga epilepsi. Sama halnya seperti kotoran ayam untuk mengobati masalah pencernaan atau kotoran kelelawar untuk mengobati kecanduan alkohol.

Ttongsul dibuat dengan fermentasi gandum yang sudah dicampur dengan tinja anak-anak berusia kurang dari enam tahun yang murni dan tidak terlalu berbau. Setelah difermentasi selama sehari, beras yang sudah dimasak dan tidak mengandung gluten dicampurkan ke dalam air fermentasi.

Gandum ini digunakan sebagai bahan fermentasi karena mengandung banyak protein, baru kemudian ditambahkan beras biasa untuk menambah rasa. Campuran tersebut kemudian disatukan dalam sebuah mangkuk dan ditambahkan air yang mengandung tinja dan didiamkan selama seminggu dalam ruangan bersuhu 30-37 derajat celcius.

Bir Urine
Metode memanfaatkan  air seni sebagai fertilizer dalam pengolahan minuman bir, dinilai sebagai cara baru yang efisien dan bisa dibuat berkelanjutan dengan konsep “beercycling ” atau bir daur ulang.

Produsen minuman bir di Denmark, Norrebro Bryghus memproduksi
Bir yang dinamakan "Pisner" yang
menggunakan campuran tanaman barkley dan air kencing manusia.

Pisner 

Mereka memang sengaja membuat campuran minuman bir dengan 50000 liter urin yang dikumpulkan dari sebuah festival musik terbesar di Eropa Utara.

Namun, urin yang dimaksud bukan jadi bahan utama pembuatan bir yang usai disaring disajikan begitu saja. Urin tersebut berperan pada proses pemupukan Barley (jelai) yang merupakan bahan pokok bir.

Tumbuhan Barley (Jelai)

Minuman bir yang berpadu dengan air seni ini disinyalir tidak memiliki bau dan rasa dari air seni sama sekali. Jika minuman bir ini ada sedikit saja mengeluarkan rasa urin atau air seni, pastinya langsung aku buang dan tidak mau minum. Tetapi , dalam minuman bir ini tidak terasa sama sekali sisa - sisa aroma dan rasa air urine


Referensi:

Tinja yang Diolah Menjadi Makanan dan Minuman
Tirto id

Menjijikkan! 7 makanan ini terbuat dari kotoran
MERDEKA.com

Steak Ini Terbuat dari Kotoran Manusia
TEMPO.CO

Heboh Bir Terbuat Dari Air Kencing, Ternyata Begini Ceritanya
TRIBUNnews.com

Berani Coba Minum Bir dengan Campuran Air Kencing? Produknya Sudah Diproduksi Masal di Denmark
Okezone.com

The Russian Firehose of Falsehood Propaganda

Since its 2008 incursion into Georgia (if not before), there has been a remarkable evolution in Russia’s approach to propaganda. This new approach was on full display during the country’s 2014 annexation of the Crimean peninsula. 

It continues to be demonstrated in support of ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and Syria and in pursuit of nefarious and long-term goals in Russia’s “near abroad” and against NATO allies.

In some ways, the current Russian approach to propaganda builds on Soviet Cold War–era techniques, with an emphasis on obfuscation and on getting targets to act in the interests of the propagandist without realizing that they have done so.

In other ways, it is completely new and driven by the characteristics of the contemporary information environment. Russia has taken advan-tage of technology and available media in ways that would have been inconceivable during the Cold War. Its tools and channels now include the Internet, social media, and the evolving landscape of professional and amateur journalism and media outlets.

We characterize the contemporary Russian model for propaganda as “the firehose of falsehood” because of two of its distinctive features: high numbers of channels and messages and ashameless willingness to disseminate partial truths or outright fictions. In the words of one observer, “[N]ew Russian propaganda entertains, confuses and overwhelms the audience.”

Contemporary Russian propaganda has at least two other distinctive features. It is also rapid, continuous, and repetitive, and it lacks commitment to consistency. Interestingly, several of these features run directly counter to the conventional wisdom on effective influence and communication from government or defense sources, which traditionally emphasize the importance of truth, credibility, and the avoidance of contradiction.

Despite ignoring these traditional principles, Russia seems to have enjoyed some success under its contemporary propaganda model, either through more direct persuasion and influence or by engaging in obfuscation, confusion, and the disruption or diminution of truthful reporting and messaging.

We offer several possible explanations for the effectiveness of Russia’s firehose of falsehood. Our observations draw from a concise, but not exhaustive, review of the literature on influence
and persuasion, as well as experimental research from the field of psychology. We explore the four identified features of the Russian propaganda model and show how and under what circumstances each might contribute to effectiveness.

Many successful aspects of Russian propaganda have surprising foundations in the psychology literature, so we conclude with a brief discussion of possible approaches from the same field for responding to or competing with such an approach.

Russian Propaganda Is High-Volume and Multichannel 
Russian propaganda is produced in incredibly large volumes and
is broadcast or otherwise distributed via a large number of channels. his propaganda includes text, video, audio, and still imagery propagated via the Internet, social media, satellite television, and traditional radio and television broadcasting. he producers and disseminators include a substantial force of paid Internet “trolls” who also often attack or undermine views or information that runs counter to Russian themes, doing so through online chat rooms, discussion forums, and comments sections on news and other websites.

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reports that “there are thousands of fake accounts on Twitter, Facebook, LiveJournal, and vKontakte”maintained by Russian propagandists. According to a former paid Russian Internet troll, the trolls are on duty 24 hours a day, in 12-hour shifts, and each has a daily quota of 135 posted comments of at least 200 characters.

RT (formerly Russia Today) is one of Russia’s primary multimedia news providers. With a budget of more than $300 million per year, it broadcasts in English, French, German, Spanish, Rus-
sian, and several Eastern European languages. The channel is particularly popular online, where it claims more than a billion page views. If true, that would make it the most-watched news source on the Internet.

In addition to a knowledged Russian sources like RT, there are dozens of proxy news sites presenting Russian propaganda, but with their ailiation with Russia disguised or downplayed.

Experimental research shows that, to achieve success in  disseminating propaganda, the variety of sources matters:
• Multiple sources are more persuasive than a single source, especially if those sources contain diferent arguments that point to the same conclusion.
• Receiving the same or similar message from multiple sources is more persuasive.
• People assume that information from multiple sources is likely to be based on diferent perspectives and is thus worth greater consideration.

The number and volume of sources also matter:
• Endorsement by a large number of users boosts consumer trust, reliance, and conidence in the information, often with little attention paid to the credibility of those making the endorsements.
• When consumer interest is low, the persuasiveness of a message can depend more on the number of arguments supporting it than on the quality of those arguments.

Finally, the views of others matter, especially if the message comes from a source that shares characteristics with the recipient:
• Communications from groups to which the recipient belongs
are more likely to be perceived as credible. he same applies
when the source is perceived as similar to the recipient. If a propaganda channel is (or purports to be) from a group the recipient identiies with, it is more likely to be persuasive.
• Credibility can be social; that is, people are more likely to
perceive a source as credible if others perceive the source as credible. his efect is even stronger when there is not enough information available to assess the trustworthiness of the source.
• When information volume is low, recipients tend to favor, but when information volume is high, recipients tend to favor information from other users. 
• In online forums, comments attacking a proponent’s expertise or trustworthiness diminish credibility and decrease the likelihood that readers will take action based on what they have read.

The experimental psychology literature suggests that, all other things being equal, messages received in greater volume and from more sources will be more persuasive. Quantity does indeed have a quality all its own. High volume can deliver other beneits that are relevant in the Russian propaganda context.

First, high volume can consume the attention and other available bandwidth of potential audiences, drowning out competing messages.
Second, high volume can overwhelm competing messages in a lood of disagreement.
Third, multiple channels increase the chances that target audiences are exposed to the message.
Fourth, receiving a message via multiple modes and from multiple sources increases the message’s perceived credibility, especially if a disseminating source is one with which an audience member identifies. 

Russian Propaganda Is Rapid, Continuous, and Repetitive
Contemporary Russian propaganda is continuous and very respon-
sive to events. Due to their lack of commitment to objective reality
(discussed later), Russian propagandists do not need to wait to check facts or verify claims; they just disseminate an interpretation of emergent events that appears to best favor their themes and objectives.

This allows them to be remarkably responsive and nimble, often broadcasting the irst “news” of events (and, with similar frequency, the irst news of nonevents, or things that have not actually happened). hey will also repeat and recycle disinformation.

The January 14, 2016, edition of Weekly Disinformation Review reported the reemergence of several previously debunked Russian propaganda stories, including that Polish President Andrzej Duda was insisting that Ukraine return former Polish territory, that Islamic State ighters were joining pro-Ukrainian forces, and that there was a Western-backed coup in Kiev, Ukraine’s capital.

Sometimes, Russian propaganda is picked up and rebroadcast
by legitimate news outlets; more frequently, social media repeats
the themes, messages, or falsehoods introduced by one of Russia’s many dissemination channels. For example, German news sources rebroadcast Russian disinformation about atrocities in Ukraine in early 2014, and Russian disinformation about EU plans to deny visas to young Ukrainian men was repeated with such frequency in Ukrainian media that the Ukrainian general staf felt compelled to
post a rebuttal.

The experimental psychology literature tells us that first impressions are very resilient: An individual is more likely to accept the irst information received on a topic and then favor this information when faced with conlicting messages.

Furthermore, repetition leads to familiarity, and familiarity leads to acceptance:
• Repeated exposure to a statement has been shown to increase its acceptance as true.
• The “illusory truth efect” is well documented, whereby people rate statements as more truthful, valid, and believable when they have encountered those statements previously than when they are new statements.
• When people are less interested in a topic, they are more likely to accept familiarity brought about by repetition as an indicator that the information (repeated to the point of famil-
iarity) is correct.
• When processing information, consumers may save time and
energy by using a frequency heuristic, that is, favoring inforamtion they have heard more frequently.
• Even with preposterous stories and urban legends, those who have heard them multiple times are more likely to believe that they are true.
• If an individual is already familiar with an argument or claim (has seen it before, for example), they process it less carefully, often failing to discriminate weak arguments from strong arguments.

Russian propaganda has the agility to be irst, which afords propagandists the opportunity to create the irst impression. Then, the combination of high-volume, multichannel, and continuous messaging makes Russian themes more likely to be familiar to their audiences, which gives them a boost in terms of perceived credibility, expertise, and trustworthiness.

Russian Propaganda Makes No Commitment to Objective Reality
It may come as little surprise that the psychology literature supports the persuasive potential of high-volume, diverse channels and sources, along with rapidity and repetition. These aspects of Russian propaganda make intuitive sense. One would expect any influence efort to enjoy greater success if it is backed by a willingness to invest in additional volume and channels and if its architects ways to increase the frequency and responsiveness of messages.

This next characteristic, however, lies in the face of intuition and
conventional wisdom, which can be paraphrased as “The truth always wins.”

Contemporary Russian propaganda makes little or no commitment to the truth. his is not to say that all of it is false. Quite the contrary: It often contains a signiicant fraction of the truth. Sometimes, however, events reported in Russian propaganda are wholly manufactured, like the 2014 social media campaign to create panic about an explosion and chemical plume in St. Mary’s Parish, Louisiana, that never happened.

Russian propaganda has relied on manufactured evidence—often photographic. Some of these images are easily exposed as fake due to poor photo editing, such as discrepancies of scale, or the availability of the original (pre-altered) image.

Russian propagandists have been caught hiring actors to portray victims of manufactured atrocities or crimes for news reports (as was the case when Viktoria Schmidt pretended to have been attacked by Syrian refugees in Germany for Russian’s Zvezda TV network), or faking on-scene news reporting (as shown in a leaked video in which “reporter” Maria Katasonova is revealed to be in a darkened room with explosion sounds playing in the background rather than on a battleield in Donetsk when a light is switched on during the recording).

In addition to manufacturing information, Russian propagan-
dists often manufacture sources. Russian news channels, such as
RT and Sputnik News, are more like a blend of infotainment and
disinformation than fact-checked journalism, though their formats
intentionally take the appearance of proper news programs. Russian news channels and other forms of media also misquote credible sources or cite a more credible source as the origin of a
selected falsehood.

For example, RT stated that blogger Brown Moses (a staunch critic of Syria’s Assad regime whose real name is Eliot Higgins) had provided analysis of footage suggesting that chemical weapon attacks on August 21, 2013, had been perpetrated by Syrian rebels. In fact, Higgins’s analysis concluded that the  Syrian government was responsible for the attacks and that the foot-age had been faked to shift the blame.

Similarly, several scholars and journalists, including Edward Lucas, Luke Harding, and Don Jensen, have reported that books that they did not write—and containing views clearly contrary to their own—had been published in Russian under their names. “The Kremlin’s spin machine wants to portray Russia as a besieged fortress surrounded by malevolent outsiders,” said Lucas of his misattributed volume, How the West Lost to Putin.

Why might this disinformation be efective?

First, people are often cognitively lazy. Due to information overload (especially on the Internet), they use a number of diferent heuristics and shortcuts to determine whether new information is trustworthy.

Second, people are often poor at discriminating true information
from false information—or remembering that they have done so previously. The following are a few examples from the literature:
• In a phenomenon known as the “sleeper efect,” low- credibility sources manifest greater persuasive impact with the passage of time. While people make initial assessments of the credibility of a source, in remembering, information is often dissociated from its source. hus, information from
a questionable source may be remembered as true, with the
source forgotten.
• Information that is initially assumed valid but is later retracted or proven false can continue to shape people’s memory and inluence their reasoning.
• Even when people are aware that some sources (such as political campaign rhetoric) have the potential to contain misinformation, they still show a poor ability to discriminate between information that is false and information that is correct. Familiar themes or messages can be appealing even if these themes and messages are false.

Information that connects with group identities or familiar narratives—or that arouses emotion—can be particularly persuasive. he literature describes the efects of this approach:
• Someone is more likely to accept information when it is consistent with other messages that the person believes to be true.
• People sufer from “conirmation bias”: hey view news and opinions that conirm existing beliefs as more credible than other news and opinions, regardless of the quality of the arguments.
• Someone who is already misinformed (that is, believes something that is not true) is less likely to accept evidence that goes against those misinformed beliefs.
• People whose peer group is afected by an event are much more likely to accept conspiracy theories about that event.
• Stories or accounts that create emotional arousal in the recipient (e.g., disgust, fear, happiness) are much more likely to be passed on, whether they are true or not.
• Angry messages are more persuasive to angry audiences.

False statements are more likely to be accepted if backed by evidence, even if that evidence is false:
• The presence of evidence can override the efects of source credibility on perceived veracity of statements.
• In courtroom simulations, witnesses who provide more details—even trivial details—are judged to be more credible.

Finally, source credibility is often assessed based on “peripheral
cues,” which may or may not conform to the reality of the situation. A broadcast that looks like a news broadcast, even if it is actually a propaganda broadcast, may be accorded the same degree of credibility as an actual news broadcast.

Findings from the field of psychology show how peripheral cues can increase the credibility of propaganda:
• Peripheral cues, such as the appearance of expertise or the
format of information, lead people to accept—with little relection—that the information comes from a credible source.
• Expertise and trust worthiness are the two primary dimensions of credibility, and these qualities may be evaluated based on visual cues, such as format, appearance, or simple claims of expertise.
• Online news sites are perceived as more credible than other online formats, regardless of the veracity of the content.

The Russian firehose of falsehood takes advantage of all ive of these factors. A certain proportion of falsehood in Russian propaganda may just be accepted by audiences because they do not recognize it as false or because various cues lead them to assign
it greater credibility than they should. his proportion actually increases over time, with people forgetting that they have rejected certain ofered “facts.”

The proportion of falsehoods accepted increases even more when the disinformation is consistent with narratives or preconceptions held by various audiences. Where evidence is presented or seemingly credible sources disseminate the falsehoods, the messages are even more likely to be accepted. This is why Russian faux-news propaganda channels, such as RT and Sputnik, are so insidious. Visually, they look like news programs, and the persons appearing on them are represented as journalists and experts, making audience members much more likely to ascribe credibility to the misinformation these sources are disseminating.

Russian Propaganda Is Not Committed to Consistencyt the final distinctive characteristic of Russian propaganda is that it is not committed to consistency.

First, diferent propaganda media do not necessarily broadcast the exact same themes or messages.
Second, diferent channels do not necessarily broadcast the same account of contested events.
Third, diferent channels or representatives show no fear of “changing their tune.” If one falsehood or misrepresentation is exposed or is not well received, the propagandists will discard it and move on to a new (though not necessarily more plausible) explanation.

One example of such behavior is the string of accounts ofered for the downing of Malaysia Airlines 
Flight. Russian sources have ofered numerous theories about how the aircraft came to be shot down and by whom, very few of which are plausible. Lack of commitment to consistency is also apparent in statements from Russian President Vladimir Putin.

For example, the first denied that the “little green men” in Crimea were Russian soldiers but later admitted that they were. Similarly, the at irst denied any desire to see Crimea join Russia, but then he admitted that that had been his plan all along.

Again, this lies in the face of the conventional wisdom on inluence and persuasion. If sources are not consistent, how can they be credible? For example, when recipients make an efort to scrutinize inconsistent messages from the same source.

How ever, the literature in experimental psychology also shows that audiences can overlook contradictions under certain circumstances:
• Contradictions can prompt a desire to understand why a shift in opinion or messages occurred. When a seemingly
strong argument for a shift is provided or assumed (e.g., more thought is given or more information is obtained), the new message can have a greater persuasive impact.
• When a source appears to have considered diferent perspectives, consumer attitudinal conidence is greater. A source who changes his or her opinion or message may be perceived as having given greater consideration to the topic, thereby
inluencing recipient conidence in the newest message. 

Potential losses in credibility due to inconsistency are potentially ofset by synergies with other characteristics of contemporary propaganda. As noted earlier in the discussion of multiple channels, the presentation of multiple arguments by multiple sources is
more persuasive than either the presentation of multiple arguments
by one source or the presentation of one argument by multiple
sources.

These losses can also be ofset by peripheral cues that enforce perceptions of credibility, trustworthiness, or legitimacy. Even if a channel or individual propagandist changes accounts of events from one day to the next, viewers are likely to evaluate the credibility of the new account without giving too much weight to the prior, “mistaken” account, provided that there are peripheral
cues suggesting the source is credible.

While the psychology literature suggests that the Russian propaganda enterprise sufers little when channels are inconsistent with each other, or when a single channel is internally inconsistent, it is unclear how inconsistency accumulates for a single prominent figure.

While inconsistent accounts by diferent propagandist on RT, for example, might be excused as the views of diferent journalists or changes due to updated information, the fabrications of Vladimir Putin have been unambiguously attributed to him, which cannot be good for his personal credibility.

Of course, perhaps many people have a low baseline expectation of the veracity of statements by politicians and world leaders. To the extent that this is the case, Putin’s fabrications, though more egregious than the routine, might be perceived as just more of what is expected from politicians in general and might not constrain his future inluence potential.

What Can Be Done to Counter the Firehose of Falsehood?
Experimental research in psychology suggests that the features of the contemporary Russian propaganda model have the potential to be highly efective. Even those features that run counter to conventional wisdom on efective inluence (e.g., the importance of veracity and consistency) receive some support in the literature.

If the Russian approach to propaganda is efective, then what can be done about it? We conclude with a few thoughts about how NATO, the United States, or other opponents of the irehose of falsehood might better compete. The first step is to recognize that this is a non trivial challenge.

Indeed, the very factors that make the firehose of falsehood efective also make it quite diicult to counter: For example, the high volume and multitude of channels for Russian propaganda ofer proportionately limited yield if one channel is taken of the air (or oline) or if a single misleading voice is discredited.

The persuasive beneits that Russian propagandists gain from presenting the irst version of events (which then must be dislodged by true accounts at much greater efort) could be removed if the true accounts were instead presented irst. But while credible and professional journalists are still checking their facts, the Russian firehose of falsehood is already lowing: It takes less time to make up facts than it does to verify them.

We are not optimistic about the efectiveness of traditional counter propaganda eforts. Certainly, some efort must be made to point out falsehoods and inconsistencies, but the same psychological evidence that shows how falsehood and inconsistency gain traction also tells us that retractions and refutations are seldom efective. Especially after a signiicant amount of time has passed, people will have trouble recalling which information they have received is the disinformation and which is the truth. Put simply, our irst suggestion is don’t expect to counter the irehose of falsehood with the squirt gun of truth.

To the extent that eforts to directly counter or refute Russian propaganda are necessary, there are some best practices available—also drawn from the ield of psychology—that can and should be employed. Three factors have been shown to increase the (limited) efectiveness of retractions and refutations:
(1) warnings at the time of initial exposure to misinformation,
(2) repetition of the retraction or refutation, and
(3) corrections that provide an alternative story to help ill the resulting gap in understanding when false “facts” are removed.

Forewarning is perhaps more efective than retractions or refutation of propaganda that has already been received. he research suggests two possible avenues:
• Propagandists gain advantage by ofering the first impression, which is hard to overcome. If, however, potential audiences have already been primed with correct information, the disinformation inds itself in the same role as a retraction or refutation: disadvantaged relative to what is already known.
• When people resist persuasion or inluence, that act reinforces their preexisting beliefs.

It may be more productive to highlight the ways in which Russian propagandists attempt to manipulate audiences, rather than ighting the speciic manipulations. In practice, getting in front of misinformation and raising awareness of misinformation might involve more robust and more
widely publicized eforts to “out” Russian propaganda sources and
the nature of their eforts. Alternatively, it could take the form of sanctions, ines, or other barriers against the practice of propaganda under the guise of journalism. The UK communications regulator, Ofcom, has sanctioned RT for biased or misleading programs, but more is needed.

Our second suggestion is to ind ways to help put raincoats on those at whom the firehose of falsehood is being directed. Another possibility is to focus on countering the efects of Russian propaganda, rather than the propaganda it self. The propagandists are working to accomplish something. The goal may be a change in attitudes, behaviors, or both. Identify those desired efects and then work to counter the efects that run contrary to your goals.

For example, suppose the goal of a set of Russian propaganda products is to undermine the willingness of citizens in NATO countries to respond to Russian aggression. Rather than trying to block, refute, or undermine the propaganda, focus instead on countering its objective. his could be accomplished through eforts to, for example, boost support for a response to Russian aggression, promote solidarity and identity with threatened NATO partners, or reairm international commitments.

Thinking about the problem in this way leads to several positive developments. It encourages prioritization: Do not worry so much about countering propaganda that contributes to efects that are not of concern. his view also opens up the aperture.

Rather than just trying to counter disinformation with other information, it might be possible to thwart desired efects with other capabilities—or to simply apply information eforts to redirecting behaviors or attitudes without ever directly engaging with the propaganda. That leads to our third suggestion: Don’t direct your low of information directly back at the firehose of falsehood; instead, point
your stream at whatever the irehose is aimed at, and try to push that audience in more productive directions.

That metaphor and mindset leads us to our fourth suggestion for responding to Russian propaganda: Compete! If Russian propaganda aims to achieve certain efects, it can be countered by preventing or diminishing those efects.

Yet, the tools of the Russian propagandists may not be available due to resource constraints or policy, legal, or ethical barriers. Although it may be diicult or impossible to directly refute Russian propaganda, both NATO and the United States have a range of capabilities to inform, influence, and persuade selected target audiences. Increase the low of persuasive information and start to compete, seeking to generate efects that support U.S. and NATO objectives.

Our fifth and inal suggestion for addressing the challenge of Russian propaganda is to use various technical means to turn of (or turn down) the low. If the firehose of falsehood is being employed as part of active hostilities, or if counter propaganda eforts escalate to include the use of a wider range of information warfare capabilities, then jamming, corrupting, degrading, destroying, usurping, or otherwise interfering with the ability of the propagandists to broadcast and disseminate their messages could diminish the impact of their eforts.

Anything from aggressive enforcement of terms of service agreements with Internet providers and social media services to electronic warfare or cyberspace operations could lower
the volume—and the impact—of Russian propaganda. 

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Bertolin, Giorgio, “Conceptualizing Russian Information Operations: Info-War and Iniltration in the Context of Hybrid Warfare,” IO Sphere, Summer 2015, pp. 10–11. As of June 1, 2016

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Claypool, Heather M., Diane M. Mackie, Teresa Garcia-Marques, Ashley McIntosh, and Ashton Udall, “The Efects of Personal Relevance and Repetition
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of Social Support and Attacks on Expertise and Trus tworthiness,” Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, Vol. 19, No. 3, April 2014, pp. 325–341.

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June 1, 2016.

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he Construct and Its Measurement After hree Decades,” Central States Speech Journal, Vol. 32, No. 1, 1981, pp. 24–34.

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Consistency, Distinctiveness, and Consensus: he hree Dimensions of the Kelley ANOVA Model of Persuasion,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 30, No. 3, March 2004, pp. 352–364.

Notes: 

Olga Oliker, “Russia’s New Military Doctrine: Same as the Old Doctrine, Mostly,” Washington Post, January 15, 2015.

Giorgio Bertolin, “Conceptualizing Russian Information Operations: Info-War and Iniltration in the Context of Hybrid Warfare,” IO Sphere, Summer 2015, p. 10.

See Adrian Chen, “The Agency,” New York Times Magazine, June 2, 2015, and Peter Pomerantsev and Michael Weiss, he Menace of Unreality: How the Kremlin Weaponizes Information, Culture and Money, New York: Institute of Modern Russia and he Interpreter, 2014.

Dmitry Volchek and Daisy Sindelar, “One Professional Russian Troll Tells All,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, March 25, 2015.

The point on the sleeper efect and credibility is from Pornpitakpan, 2004, and Henkel and Mattson, 2011. See also Lewandowsky et al., 2012, and Ullrich K. H. Ecker, Stephan Lewandowsky, Olivia Fenton, and Kelsey Martin, “Do People Keep Believing Because hey Want to? Preexisting Attitudes and Continued Inluence of Misinformation,” Memory and Cognition, Vol. 42, No. 2, 2014. The point on information that is later retracted or proven false is from Ecker et al., 2014. See also Lewandowsky et al., 2012. The point on awareness of potential misinformation is from Lewandowsky et al., 2012.

These points on evidence and credibility are from, respectively, Pornpitakpan, 2004, and Brad E. Bell and Elizabeth F. Loftus, “Trivial Persuasion in the Courtroom: 
he Power of (a Few) Minor Details,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 56, No. 5, May 1989.

René Ziegler, Michael Diehl, Rafael Zigon, and Torsten Fett, “Source Consistency, Distinctiveness, and Consensus: he hree Dimensions of the Kelley ANOVA Model of Persuasion,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 30, No. 3, March 2004.

Source:
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About Authors:

Christopher Paul is a senior social scientist at RAND and a professor at the Pardee RAND Graduate School. He is also an adjunct faculty member in the Center for Economic Development in the Heinz College at Carnegie Mellon University.

Christopher Paul

He focuses on developing methodological competencies for comparative historical and case-study approaches, evaluation research, various forms of quantitative analysis, and survey research. He has published on such topics as insurgency and counterinsurgency, building
international partner capacity, and information operations and strategic communication.

Miriam Matthews is a behavioral and social scientist at RAND and a professor at the Pardee RAND Graduate School. She conducts research in the areas of political psychology, international conflict, and diversity and multiculturalism.

Miriam Matthews

She has published on the factors that contribute to negative intergroup attitudes, the influence of acculturation ideologies, the effects of threats on political attitudes, and the origins of support for anti Western jihad.

Sering Mengonsumsi Mie Instan Dapat Memicu Gagal Ginjal, Kanker, Diabetes, Obesitas dan Gangguan Pencernaan (Studi Ilmiah)

Akumulasi zat kimia berbahaya seperti pengawet dan pewarna akan menjadi racun di dalam tubuh, mengganggu proses metabolisme tubuh, bahkan memicu penyakit berbahaya (apabila dikonsumsi terus menerus dalam jangka waktu yang panjang).

Mie Instan (depositphotos.com)

Gagal Ginjal
Gagal ginjal merupakan suatu kondisi di mana ginjal mengalami kerusakan yang serius sehingga tidak bisa menjalankan fungsi sebagaimana mestinya. Fungsi utama ginjal adalah untuk menyaring darah dari limbah beracun ataupun cairan berlebih dalam tubuh.

Gagal Ginjal (Foto: 123RF Stock Image) 

Jika ginjal tidak dapat menjalankan fungsinya dengan baik, kadar racun dan cairan berbahaya akan terkumpul di dalam tubuh. Hal inilah yang nantinya memberikan masalah bagi kesehatan Anda. Bahkan, jika tidak segera ditangani, ginjal yang mengalami kerusakan ini akhirnya bisa berhenti berfungsi sepenuhnya. Akibatnya, bisa fatal bahkan mematikan.

Tulisan ini tidak bermaksud untuk mendiskreditkan produsen atau merk mie instan tertentu. Tulisan ini bertujuan untuk berbagi pengetahuan dan informasi, berdasarkan riset para pakar dan ahli.

Fakta yang sulit dibantah adalah mie instan merupakan makanan cepat saji yang memiliki kandungan nutrisi yang tidak selengkap makanan sehat. Sebenarnya memakan mie instan boleh saja, asalkan tidak dijadikan kebiasaan setiap hari.

Berdasarkan sebuah penelitian yang dilakukan oleh Dr. Braden Kuo dari Massachusetts General Hospital, Amerika Serikat, mie instan ternyata sangat aktif dalam mengganggu pencernaan manusia, seperti yang dikutip dari WCVB.

Dr. Braden Kuo 

Hal ini diketahui dari hasil rekaman di dalam perut menggunakan kamera pintar berbentuk pil yang di masukkan ke dalam tubuh. Di rekaman tersebut terlihat tubuh kesusahan untuk menghancurkan mie instan.

Peneliti mencoba menggunakan mie olahan sendiri sebagai perbandingan. Namun dalam kurun waktu 2 jam saja, mie olahan sendiri sudah hancur dan berhasil dicerna. Sementara mie instan belum juga hancur.

Dari percobaan itu, terbukti bahwa mie instan sangat susah dicerna oleh tubuh. Artinya membutuhkan waktu yang sangat lama untuk menghancurkannya. Inilah penyebab mengapa mie instan dapat mengganggu kinerja sistem pencernaan tubuh.

Apabila dikonsumsi terus menerus dan dalam jangka waktu yang panjang, maka mie instant dapat mengacaukan metabolisme tubuh. Akumulasi zat kimia berbahaya seperti pengawet dan pewarna akan menjadi racun di dalam tubuh.

Bahan utama mi instan adalah tepung terigu dan lemak. Mie instant akan menghambat dan membatasi penyerapan nutrisi makanan. Sehingga tidak akan dapat memenuhi jumlah nutrisi yang dibutuhkan oleh tubuh. Nutrisi dalam mi tidak menyediakan cukup kalori yang diperlukan untuk semua aktivitas tubuh.

Oleh karena itu, terlalu sering mengonsumsi mie instan bisa memicu kelebihan karbohidrat dan lemak. Hal tersebut dapat memicu obesitas dan diabetes. Diabetes umumnya mengakibatkan komplikasi ginjal.

Kandungan Nutrisi Mie Instan (Foto: Centre for Food Safety)

Kandungan zat Propylene glycol yang terdapat dalam beberapa merek mie instan, merupakan zat antibeku yang membuat mie tidak mengering. Jika Propylene glycol diserap oleh tubuh, maka zat ini akan menumpuk dalam area hati, liver, dan ginjal.

Mie instan mengandung lemak jenuh dan lemak trans yang cukup tinggi. Lemak ini meningkatkan kadar kolesterol jahat dalam darah, yang dapat menyebabkan risiko penumpukan atau tersumbatnya pembuluh darah.

Tubuh manusia memerlukan protein sebagai zat pembangun dan pendorong metabolisme dalam tubuh. Namun makanan tinggi protein menyebabkan penumpukan produk limbah yang terlalu besar di ginjal.

Selain itu, kadar sodium mie instan yang tinggi menyebabkan darah tinggi, penyakit jantung, stroke dan kerusakan pada ginjal. Kadar sodium yang tinggi membuatnya mudah membentuk batu ginjal dalam tubuh.

Bumbu mie instan terdapat banyak kandungan MSG (monosodium glutamat), untuk meningkatkan cita rasa. Sedangkan untuk memperpanjang masa kadaluarsa, produsen sering menambahkan beberapa zat seperti fosfat, dan pengawet ke dalam mie.

Ketika disimpan terlalu lama dan dipengaruhi oleh lingkungan, zat-zat ini perlahan akan berubah. Bahan-bahan ini jika menumpuk di dalam tubuh, bisa menyebabkan kanker.

Dari kemasan, mie instan juga dapat memicu kanker. Beberapa mie instant dikemas dalam styrofoam, di mana styrofoam adalah penyebab kanker  jika masuk kedalam tubuh. Mie instant yang hanya disajikan dengan direndam air panas, saat terkena panas, zat kimia di dalam styrofoam ini akan ikut bereaksi.

Cup Mie (IStock foto) 

Namun, bahaya itu semua seolah terlupakan dengan rasa mi instan yang enak. Selain alasan rasa, mi instan juga dianggap praktis dalam proses pembuatannya.


Referensi:

[PDF] Chronic Kidney Disease and Nutrition
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[PDF] Morphological Changes Induced by Instant Noodles Food
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The Dark Side of Instant Noodles: What Makes Them Harmful?
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The Harmful Effects of Instant Noodles
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This Is What Happens to Your Body When You Eat Instant Ramen
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This video will make you want to drop instant noodles from your diet
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5 Bahaya yang Mengintai Jika Makan Mi Instan Setiap Hari, Sebabkan Batu Ginjal hingga Kanker
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Ngeri, ini yang terjadi pada tubuh saat makan mie instan!
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10 Alasan Jangan Makan Mie Instant
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Katanya berbahaya, kenapa orang Indonesia doyan makan mi instan?
MERDEKA.com